

Artificial Intelligence, CS, Nanjing University Spring, 2017, Yang Yu

# Lecture 4: Search 3

http://cs.nju.edu.cn/yuy/course\_ai17.ashx







Path-based search

Uninformed search

Depth-first, breadth first, uniform-cost search

Informed search

Best-first, A\* search

# Adversarial search

Competitive environments: Game the agents' goals are in conflict

We consider: \* two players \* zero-sum games

Type of games: \* deterministic v.s. chance \* perfect v.s. partially observable information









# 两人轮流在一有九格方盘上划加字或圆圈, 谁先把 三个同一记号排成横线、直线、斜线, 即是胜者



## Definition of a game



- $S_0$ : The **initial state**, which specifies how the game is set up at the start.
- PLAYER(s): Defines which player has the move in a state.
- ACTIONS(s): Returns the set of legal moves in a state.
- RESULT(s, a): The **transition model**, which defines the result of a move.
- TERMINAL-TEST(s): A **terminal test**, which is true when the game is over and false otherwise. States where the game has ended are called **terminal states**.
- UTILITY (s, p): A utility function (also called an objective function or payoff function),



two players: MAX and MIN



# Optimal decision in games

Perfect play for deterministic, perfect-information games

Idea: choose move to position with highest minimax value = best achievable payoff against best play





# Minimax algorithm



function MINIMAX-DECISION(state) returns an action
inputs: state, current state in game

return the *a* in ACTIONS(*state*) maximizing MIN-VALUE(RESULT(*a*, *state*))

function Max-Value(state) returns a utility value
if TERMINAL-TEST(state) then return UTILITY(state)

 $v \! \leftarrow \! - \! \infty$ 

for a, s in SUCCESSORS(*state*) do  $v \leftarrow MAX(v, MIN-VALUE(s))$ return v

function MIN-VALUE(state) returns a utility value if TERMINAL-TEST(state) then return UTILITY(state)  $v \leftarrow \infty$ for a, s in SUCCESSORS(state) do  $v \leftarrow MIN(v, MAX-VALUE(s))$ return v

#### **Properties of Minimax**

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Complete?? Yes, if tree is finite (chess has specific rules for this)

Optimal ?? Yes, against an optimal opponent. Otherwise??

<u>Time complexity</u>??  $O(b^m)$ 

Space complexity?? O(bm) (depth-first exploration)

For chess,  $b \approx 35$ ,  $m \approx 100$  for "reasonable" games  $\Rightarrow$  exact solution completely infeasible

# Multiple players

a vector  $\langle v_A, v_B, v_C \rangle$  is used for 3 players





## Alpha-Beta pruning

#### not all branches are needed















# Alpha-Beta pruning

- $\alpha$  = the value of the best (i.e., highest-value) choice we have found so far at any choice point along the path for MAX.
- $\beta$  = the value of the best (i.e., lowest-value) choice we have found so far at any choice point along the path for MIN.



# Alpha-Beta pruning

**function** ALPHA-BETA-SEARCH(*state*) **returns** an action  $v \leftarrow MAX-VALUE(state, -\infty, +\infty)$ **return** the *action* in ACTIONS(*state*) with value v

```
function MAX-VALUE(state, \alpha, \beta) returns a utility value
if TERMINAL-TEST(state) then return UTILITY(state)
v \leftarrow -\infty
for each a in ACTIONS(state) do
v \leftarrow MAX(v, MIN-VALUE(RESULT(s, a), \alpha, \beta))
if v \ge \beta then return v
\alpha \leftarrow MAX(\alpha, v)
return v
```

function MIN-VALUE(state,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ) returns a utility value if TERMINAL-TEST(state) then return UTILITY(state)  $v \leftarrow +\infty$ for each a in ACTIONS(state) do  $v \leftarrow MIN(v, MAX-VALUE(RESULT(s, a), \alpha, \beta))$ if  $v \leq \alpha$  then return v $\beta \leftarrow MIN(\beta, v)$ return v

### Properties of alpha-beta



Pruning does not affect final result

Good move ordering improves effectiveness of pruning

With "perfect ordering," time complexity =  $O(b^{m/2})$  $\Rightarrow$  **doubles** solvable depth

A simple example of the value of reasoning about which computations are relevant (a form of metareasoning)

Unfortunately,  $35^{50}$  is still impossible!

### The search order is important

it might be worthwhile to try to examine first the successors that are likely to be best



#### **Resource limits**

Standard approach:



• Use EVAL instead of UTILITY

i.e., evaluation function that estimates desirability of position

Suppose we have 100 seconds, explore 10<sup>4</sup> nodes/second  $\Rightarrow 10^6$  nodes per move  $\approx 35^{8/2}$  $\Rightarrow \alpha - \beta$  reaches depth 8  $\Rightarrow$  pretty good chess program



# **Evaluation functions**



Black to move

White slightly better

White to move Black winning

For chess, typically linear weighted sum of features

 $Eval(s) = w_1 f_1(s) + w_2 f_2(s) + \ldots + w_n f_n(s)$ 

e.g.,  $w_1 = 9$  with  $f_1(s) =$  (number of white queens) – (number of black queens), etc.





#### H-Minimax

```
 \begin{aligned} \text{H-MINIMAX}(s,d) &= & \text{if Cutoff-Test}(s,d) \\ & \left\{ \begin{aligned} \text{Eval}(s) & \text{if Cutoff-Test}(s,d) \\ & \max_{a \in Actions(s)} \text{H-MINIMAX}(\text{Result}(s,a),d+1) & \text{if Player}(s) = \text{MAX} \\ & \min_{a \in Actions(s)} \text{H-MINIMAX}(\text{Result}(s,a),d+1) & \text{if Player}(s) = \text{MIN.} \end{aligned} \right.
```



Behaviour is preserved under any monotonic transformation of EVAL

Only the order matters:

payoff in deterministic games acts as an ordinal utility function

#### Deterministic games in practice

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Checkers: Chinook ended 40-year-reign of human world champion Marion Tinsley in 1994. Used an endgame database defining perfect play for all positions involving 8 or fewer pieces on the board, a total of 443,748,401,247 positions.

Chess: Deep Blue defeated human world champion Gary Kasparov in a sixgame match in 1997. Deep Blue searches 200 million positions per second, uses very sophisticated evaluation, and undisclosed methods for extending some lines of search up to 40 ply.

Othello: human champions refuse to compete against computers, who are too good.

Go: human champions refuse to compete against computers, who are too bad. In go, b > 300, so most programs use pattern knowledge bases to suggest plausible moves.

#### Stochastic games

backgammon:





#### **Expect-minimax**

In nondeterministic games, chance introduced by dice, card-shuffling Simplified example with coin-flipping:



EXPECTIMINIMAX(s) =

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{UTILITY}(s) & \text{if } \text{TERMINAL-TEST}(s) \\ \max_{a} \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s,a)) & \text{if } \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{MAX} \\ \min_{a} \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s,a)) & \text{if } \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{MIN} \\ \sum_{r} P(r) \text{EXPECTIMINIMAX}(\text{RESULT}(s,r)) & \text{if } \text{PLAYER}(s) = \text{CHANCE} \end{array}$ 



### Nondeterministic games in practice



Dice rolls increase b: 21 possible rolls with 2 dice Backgammon  $\approx$  20 legal moves (can be 6,000 with 1-1 roll)

depth  $4 = 20 \times (21 \times 20)^3 \approx 1.2 \times 10^9$ 

As depth increases, probability of reaching a given node shrinks  $\Rightarrow$  value of lookahead is diminished

 $\alpha \text{-}\beta$  pruning is much less effective

 $TDGAMMON \text{ uses depth-2 search} + \text{very good } EVAL \\ \approx \text{world-champion level}$ 

## Games of imperfect information



- E.g., card games, where opponent's initial cards are unknown
- Typically we can calculate a probability for each possible deal
- Seems just like having one big dice roll at the beginning of the game  $^{\ast}$
- Idea: compute the minimax value of each action in each deal, then choose the action with highest expected value over all deals\*
- Special case: if an action is optimal for all deals, it's optimal. $^*$
- GIB, current best bridge program, approximates this idea by1) generating 100 deals consistent with bidding information2) picking the action that wins most tricks on average



 ${}^{*}$  Intuition that the value of an action is the average of its values in all actual states is  ${\bf WRONG}$ 

With partial observability, value of an action depends on the information state or belief state the agent is in

Can generate and search a tree of information states

Leads to rational behaviors such as

- $\diamondsuit$  Acting to obtain information
- $\diamond$  Signalling to one's partner
- $\diamond$  Acting randomly to minimize information disclosure